## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

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SPOT COMMENTARY: Poland

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Prime Minister Jaruzelski's declaration this morning of a state of emergency in Poland begins a final test of his regimes ability to govern Poland.

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The police and other forces of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs will continue to play the main role during the next several days in quelling the strong reaction promised by Solidarity. Polish regular army troops will be involved primarily in a passive security role unless internal security forces are unable to control the confrontations. Polish airborne forces are to help secure areas of Warsaw.

According to the plan, government measures during the the next several ays should include:

- --Continued arrests of Solidarity and other opposition activists.
- -- Instituting censorship, sealing borders and securing key government installations.
- --Shutting down all non-government media.
- -- Imposing tight security in critical areas of large cities.
- -- Installing military at airports, suspending internal air traffic.
- --Placing key industrial facilities under military guard, in some cases installing military supervision.
- --Activating a wartime foodssupply system.
- --Restricting activities of diplomatic missions and foreign correspondents.

didespread army mobilization was scheduled to begin immediately upon the eclaration of a state of emergency. The government apparently hopes that

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mobilization will serve to drain some of the energy of public reaction and draing it under military control.

In the event of strikes and street violence, selected plants and areas of disturbance are to be sealed off. Emergency food stocks are to be distributed in an effort to blunt public reaction.

Polish party leader Jaruzelski is counting on three factors to carry his new martial law government through the dangerous days that lie ahead:

- -- Respect for the military as a national institution.
- --Hope that relatively moderate and balanced martial law policies will be tolerated by the population.
- --Belief that the population has become so tired of strikes and continuing strife that it has withdrawn some of its support from Solidarity.

Each of these propositions, however, is highly problematic. The military has been highly respected primarily because it has not actively opposed what the population considers its basic interests. The military's recent assistance in the countryside and cities improved its image because the teams were seen working for the people and against the entrenched local bureaucracies. This perception will change quickly if the military acts not as a defender but as an oppressor.

Jaruzelski's initial statement was couched in moderate, balanced and tionalist terms. He announced that Solidarity "militants" (presumably excluding Walesa and other moderates) and some former members of the party leadership had been arrested. He appealed to Polish workers to give up their right to strike without announcing that it had been abrogated. He cited the need for the Poles to solve their own problems, suggesting that if they cannot, Moscow will.

A general strike seems inevitable. Nost Poles will feel that their efforts to create a politically reformed Poland have now been aborted. Combined with their frustrations over economic problems, this is likely to cause a complete loss of hope for the future. Solidarity moderates almost certainly will support their colleagues who have been arrested and become radical; those arrested will be replaced by even more militant leaders.

We also doubt that, despite recent government polls, the population has turned away from Solidarity. By and large, the party and government still are blamed for Poland's current problems.

The Church will try to play a moderating role even though some of its leaders must feel betrayed because they thought they had assurances earlier that the regime would not consider emergency measures. Some local priests, however, will support worker actions against the regime. The Church could

ome even more of a regime adversary in the next few weeks as it defends in and civil rights.

Today there will be great uncertainty, anxiety and anger over Jaruzelski's move. Poles will turn to their priests for advice and will be told to avoid intemperate actions. But later, they will turn to themselves as they gather to exchange information and to show their protest. In a heated environment it is likely that some of the crowds will get out of hand and march on party or government headquarters. If the police are forced to step in to protect buildings, there could be violence that could quickly spread.

Some workers today may also try to go to their factories, as Solidarity's emergency plans for martial law call for them to do. If they are prevented from entering, they might try to force the issue or they could vent their anger on regime buildings. The police and internal security forces will be responsible for countering such actions, but could be overwhelmed. It is at that point that the military will be called in and its reliability put to the test. Some Polish soldiers will balk at firing on or forcefully expelling Polish workers from the factories. Neither we nor Jaruzelski can be certain how much this will erode the capability of the Polish forces trying to maintain order.

Even if today goes peacefully, we expect the anger to build and be expressed when workers show up at their factories tomorrow morning. They will stage sit ins—if they gain access to the factories—and the regime will then have to decide whether to get them out of the factories or wait mout. In any case, the country will be brought to a halt and such a talemate could go on for weeks. The regime in this period would probably make some gestures to the Church and Solidarity moderates in an effort to prevent a civil war. We cannot predict with any confidence how successful the regime will be.

